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Interim State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44194
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2015-6056
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After a jury trial, Ms. Harkins was convicted of one count of battery upon a law
enforcement officer.  The district court imposed a sentence of four years, with two years
fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Harkins on probation.  On appeal,
Ms. Harkins asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the
underlying sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In March of 2015, Ms. Harkins and her boyfriend Coby spent the night at Betty
Anderson’s home; Ms. Anderson is Coby’s aunt.  (7/21/15 Tr., p.41, L.16 – p.44, L.25;
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Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.8-9.)1  At some point, Ms. Harkins called the
police to report that she had been the victim of a battery.  (7/21/15 Tr., p.49, Ls.8-17;
PSI, p. 8.)  Deputy Shearn of the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to
Ms. Anderson’s home.  (PSI, pp.8-9.)   When he arrived, he spoke with Ms. Harkins who
appeared intoxicated.  (PSI, pp.8-9.)  Ms. Harkins told Deputy Shearn that she was an
undercover police officer, a military attorney, and that she was married to the Homedale
Police Chief.  (PSI, p.9.)  At one point, Ms. Harkins became aggressive and stood up
from where she was sitting and brought her hands up towards Deputy Shearn’s neck.
(PSI, p.9.)  Deputy Shearn then subdued Ms. Harkins and arrested her.  (PSI, p.9.)
Ms. Harkins was charged, by Information, with one count of battery upon a law
enforcement officer.  (R., pp.22-23.)  Ms. Harkins elected to proceed to trial, and at the
jury trial, Deputy Shearn testified that Ms. Harkins stood up and “grabbed ahold” of his
neck, so he “grabbed her and then twisted her arm back and then pushed her up
against the house.”  (7/21/15 Tr., p.85, L.21 – p.86, L.8.)  However, on cross-
examination, Deputy Shearn admitted that Ms. Harkins did not grab his neck but only
touched it.  (7/21/15 Tr., p.94, L.20 – p.95, L.14.)  He admitted that he wrote this in his
police report and testified to it at the preliminary hearing.2  (7/21/15 Tr., p.94, L.23 –
p.97, L.17.)  He also acknowledged that he was not injured, and there were no marks
1 All references to the PSI refer to the 164-page electronic document.  The PSI was
updated after Ms. Harkins was deemed fit to proceed following an extended mental
health commitment after her jury trial.  (See R., pp.61, 78, 82.)
2 Based on this information, prior to trial, Ms. Harkins’ counsel moved for a lesser
included instruction to inform the jury that “unlawful touching” is a misdemeanor battery
only, but the district court denied the motion.  (7/21/15 Tr. (Voir Dire) p.5, L.9 – p.14,
L.25; 7/21/15 Tr., p.12, L.9 – p.18, L.5.)  Defense counsel objected to the verdict form
for the same reasons.  (7/21/15 Tr., p.108, Ls.6-25.)
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left on his neck from the touch.  (7/21/15 Tr., p.97, Ls.20-22.)  Ms. Harkins was
subsequently found guilty of one count of battery upon a law enforcement officer.
(R., p.98.)
Prior to sentencing, the district court ordered a mental health evaluation pursuant
to I.C. § 18-211.  (R., p.61.)  After an extended mental health commitment, Ms. Harkins
was deemed fit to proceed, and a sentencing hearing was held on May 5, 2016.
(R., pp.61-78; 5/5/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.4-23.)  At that hearing, the State recommended that
the district court place Ms. Harkins on probation and require that she participate in
mental health court; the State did not recommend an underlying sentence.  (5/5/16 Tr.,
p.15, L.21 – p.16, L.21.)  Ms. Harkins’ counsel requested that the district court impose
an underlying sentence of three years, with one year fixed, and place Ms. Harkins on
probation.  (5/5/16 Tr., p.18, L.6 – p.20, L.9.)  The district court imposed a sentence of
four years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Harkins on
probation for three years, and required that she attend mental health court.  (5/5/16 Tr.,
p.23, L.25 – p.27, L.15; R., pp.98-100.)  Subsequently, Ms. Harkins filed a Notice of
Appeal that was timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.91-93.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an underlying sentence of four
years, with two years fixed, following Ms. Harkins’ conviction for battery upon a law
enforcement officer?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Underlying Sentence Of
Four Years, With Two Years Fixed, Following Ms. Harkins’ Conviction For Battery Upon
A Law Enforcement Officer
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Based on the facts of this case, Ms. Harkins’ underlying sentence of four years,
with two years fixed, is excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of
sentencing.  When there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent examination of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000).  When a
sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion.
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982).  Unless it appears that confinement was
necessary “to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given
case,” a sentence is unreasonable. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App.
1982).  Accordingly, if the sentence is excessive, “under any reasonable view of the
facts,” because it is not necessary to achieve these goals, it is unreasonable and
therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are several mitigating factors that illustrate why Ms. Harkins’ sentence is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  First, it is clear from the record that
Ms. Harkins struggles with significant mental health issues.  Her psychological
evaluation revealed that she was “extremely delusional,” and she believed that she was
“working undercover in an internal investigation mission with the military since the
1980’s (she was born in 1984) and that her current court case should only be heard in a
military court.”  (PSI, p.53.)  Later, the evaluator noted that Ms. Harkins believed that
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“she is in every branch of the military and that her lowest rank in every branch is the
Commanding Officer.”  (PSI, p.57.)  This was consistent with the information that she
gave Deputy Shearn when he initially spoke with her on the night of the offense.
(PSI, p.9.)  In summary, the psychological evaluator wrote that Ms. Harkins was
“seriously mentally ill and in need of psychiatric intervention.”  (PSI, p.57.)  A
defendant’s mental health condition can be a significant mitigating factor. State v.
Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994) (“Idaho Code § 19–2523, which requires that the
trial court consider the defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an integral
part of the legislature’s repeal of mental condition as a defense.”).
Additionally, Ms. Harkins struggles with serious substance abuse problems.  Her
mother stated that Ms. Harkins used to be an intelligent woman and a great mother, but
her drug use had dramatically affected her mental health.  (PSI, pp.69-70.)  A
defendant’s substance abuse problems should also be considered as mitigating
information. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981) (“While the ingestion of
drugs or alcohol by appellant on the evening of the offense is not sufficient in itself to
raise a defense to the crime, it is our conclusion that any arguable impact of such
substance abuse is a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon
sentencing.”).
This  was  Ms.  Harkins’  first  felony  conviction.   (PSI,  pp.10-15.)   This  is  also  a
long-recognized mitigating factor. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).  Finally,
Deputy Shearn was not injured at all by Ms. Harkins; she only touched his neck in the
altercation.  (7/21/15 Tr., p.97, Ls.20-22.)
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In light of all the mitigating information and the facts of this case, Ms. Harkins
asserts her underlying sentence was excessive because it was not necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing outlined in Toohill and was therefore unreasonable and
an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Harkins respectfully requests that this Court reduce her underlying sentence
as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 10th day of January, 2016.
_____/S/____________________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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